

## **Exploration into IGAD's Contributions towards Peace and Stability in Mogadishu, Somalia**

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### **ABSTRACT**

*The study sought to investigate the IGAD's socio-economic, political, and environmental contributions contribution to peace and stability in Mogadishu, Somalia. A qualitative case study design was used in this work. Among the 15 people who took part in the survey were IGAD officials, parliamentarians, civil society activists, political analysts, and ministers. These participants were chosen using snowball sampling and purposive sampling techniques. Data were gathered from these participants through interviews conducted with the aid of an interview guide. The findings revealed that IGAD contributed to Somalia's peace and stability by initiating mediation, and re-establishment of the Transitional Federal Government and its security capabilities It also contributed to the socio-economic development of the region by promoting regional economic integration, free movement of goods, services, and people, the creation of a conducive environment for cross-border trade, the promotion of sustainable development, the provision of social services such as schools and hospitals, and immigration issues. According to the study, it also established a drought disaster resilience sustainability program, as well as complementary programs aimed at implementing the drought resilience agenda in arid and semi-arid areas. The study also discovered that IGAD improved Somalia's access to early warning systems.*

**KEYWORDS:** IGAD, Peace and Stability, Early Warning System, Conflict.

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### **Background to the Study**

The study's main objectives are to assess the IGAD's contribution to peace and stability in Mogadishu, Somalia. The specific objectives were (a) to examine the IGAD's socio-economic, (b) political, and (c) environmental contributions to peace and stability in Mogadishu. In this regard, the study is useful for policymakers and academics to use as source information for decision-making and further research respectively. This study is also important to the community because it highlights the contribution of intergovernmental organizations toward reducing conflict tension to peace and stability. Peace and stability have become a big issue around the world as a result of the worrisome rise in the frequency of violent conflicts. As a result of weak governance, already marginalized communities of the world's poor are being forced to leave their homes, causing new demographic concerns. Conflicts exacerbate

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nationalism and obstruct development in both impoverished and previous middle-income countries. Many actors, such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and others, contribute to global peace and stability. For example, the United Nations (UN) has aided in the resolution of conflicts in several parts of the world, including those in Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to name a few (Ampomah, 2021; Mekuriyaw, 2017; Mulugeta, 2010). The OIC too has had remarkable success in settling several long-standing issues, particularly among member states. For example, the OIC was essential in bringing the Philippines' government to a peace agreement with Nur Misuari, the Moro National Liberation Front's leader (MNLF). The OIC's insistence on treating the dispute within the context of the Philippines' territorial integrity influenced the type of strategy that was utilized to resolve the conflict. In the Philippines, OIC mediation showed a high level of commitment and long-term engagement with the dispute and its participants (Sharqieh, 2012).

Several organizations, such as the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU), contribute to continental peace and stability. For example, the European Union (EU) has been active in conflict resolution in Afghanistan, Libya, Chechnya, Turkey, and many other locations. The African Union has also contributed to peace and stability in nations such as Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Burundi, Somalia, and others, mostly on the African continent (Wiebusch, 2016). In 2003, Burundi received African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) which was wholly designed, organized, and executed by African Union members. It was a watershed moment in the African Union's ability to operationalize and carry out peacebuilding on its own. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) has approved the deployment of 3,500 military and civilian personnel. Its job was to keep track of everything that happened. In December 2002, the country's warring factions agreed to implement a ceasefire agreement. A little more than a year later, the UN took over AMIB and established the UN Mission. The United Nations chose to participate in Burundi's peace process, after the country had made steady progress in June 2004, withdrew its forces, and gave the African Union responsibility for maintaining a tiny peacekeeping mission. A task force was dispatched to the area in support of continuing peacebuilding efforts (Moolakkattu, 2010 & DeConing, 2017).

Many regional organizations help to keep Africa safe and secure. As a regional participant, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has been involved in several wars in West African countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire. For example, ECOWAS was one of the parties involved in the Liberian civil war, and Liberian President Samuel Doe requested that ECOWAS send an intervention peacekeeping force into Liberia in August 1990. In this spirit, the mandate of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was framed in the spirit of traditional peacekeeping (Francis, 2009). Similarly, SADC intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with its standby force comprising troops from South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, which successfully defeated the Congolese Revolutionary Army popularly known as the March 23 Movement (M23). The food crisis, drought, and escalating levels of poverty and underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as conflict in the Horn of Africa, threatened Ethiopia and Somalia, making the establishment of peace and security institutions more important and necessary than in other African regions. As a result, the United Nations saw it necessary to form IGAD as a coordinating body to address these issues. The IGADD's goals were limited to functional collaboration in the areas of environmental protection, food security, and natural resource management (Healy, 2009). For example, the war in Somalia has existed for a long time. As a result several global, continental, regional, and national agencies have attempted to restore peace and stability in the country. For example, the UN was involved in the Somalia conflict until it mandated the United States to resolve it, but it failed to do so in the early 1990s, leaving Somalia in ruins. The duty of spearheading Somalia's peacebuilding operations was also given to the AU and IGAD. All of this suggests that the

Somalia conflict has persisted for decades despite the efforts of numerous organizations to end it and establish peace in the country. Interesting to know, the IGAD's mandate was revised in the late 1980s, expanding it from environmental preservation to regional peace and stability (Hassan, 2017). It has since taken part in a variety of activities and peacekeeping missions aimed at stabilizing Somalia. It mandated its member nations to deal with the war in Somalia, and in June 1991, it assisted Hassan Guoled Aptidon, the president of Djibouti, in organizing a mediation meeting for all Somalia's opposing parties, which was attended by all IGAD member states (Hassan, 2017; Mulugeta, 2010).

### **Statement of the Problem**

Because Somalia continues to be embroiled in several conflicts, including intra-state ones like extremism, warlord and clannish fights, insurgent groups like al-Shabab, etc., as well as inter-state ones like land disputes with Kenya and Ethiopia, peace and stability remain the most pressing challenges. In addition, new conflicts are also arising, such as arms proliferation, and terrorism. Hundreds of thousands of people have died and millions have been displaced as a result of the turmoil in Somalia. Religious leaders, clan elders, the IGAD, the AU, the OIC, the EU, the UN, and other local, regional, and international organizations have all contributed to restoring peace and stability in Somalia. Despite these contributions, conflict in Somalia continues, and therefore true peace and stability in this country is still a long way off. In fact, many foreign actors withdrew their participation in peacebuilding without fully succeeding. However, IGAD has remained and continue to engage in peacebuilding process to restore peace and stability in Somalia (Farole, 2018; Hassan, 2017; Menkhaus, 2018). This study examined IGAD's role in peace and stability in Mogadishu, an area which has been hit most by conflict in Somalia.

### **Theoretical and Conceptual Framework**


In view of M'Cormack (2012) theory of change serves as the foundation for the conceptual framework. This theory of change assumes that multiple acts are linked, resulting in the reduction of conflict and the establishment of peace and stability. Changes in political, socioeconomic, and environmental activities, according to this view, are drivers that can help prevent conflict situations. States in conflict concentrate on change processes that encompass political, socioeconomic, and environmental dynamics, among other things, to reduce state fragility and increase citizen security (Shapiro, 2006). This entails determining where there are gaps and unmet needs. IGAD's engagement in Somalia to identify gaps and unmet requirements in the political, socioeconomic, and environmental domains is based on this premise, to assist the Somali government in improving its central authority, socioeconomic and political institutions, and the environment. Figure 1 depicts IGAD's involvement in political, socioeconomic, and environmental processes that reduce tension and attempt to end the conflict. Advocacy, capacity building, community development services, and environmental preservation, among other things, are seen to be drivers of people's perceptions, feelings, behavior, and attitudes. These aim at improving communication and interpersonal relationships to transform hostile tendencies into fostering peace and stability.

### **Literature Review**

Resolving conflict and maintaining peace and stability involves different actors such as states, intergovernmental organizations, and individuals engaging in processes of change. For instance, Ampomah (2021), argues that the United Nations has set extraordinarily high criteria for sustaining global peace and stability. He argues that the UN uses peace operations, in which

national troop contingents and other UN specialists work together to restore and preserve peace and stability, as one of the most significant ways. He stresses that in practice, how peace and security issues are handled is largely determined by the UN Security Council's (UNSC) institutional framework, which is driven by the permanent five's (P-5) perspectives. The UN's position as a legitimate actor in averting conflicts and keeping the peace has been challenged, contested, and accepted all over the world since 1945. It not only has the identity, power, and experience to act on behalf of member nations to maintain peace and security, but it also has access to the resources required to do so. De Coning (2017) argues that African countries provided barely 10,000 troops to UN peacekeeping missions when the African Union (AU) was created in 2000. The African Union has its peacekeeping missions in Burundi (AMIB), the Central African Republic (CAR) (MISCA), Comoros (AMISEC and MAES), Mali (AFISMA), Somalia (AMISOM), and Sudan (AMISOM) (AMIS I and II). The African Union assumed command of the African Operation in Somalia (AMISOM) in early 2017, and it has since grown to be the world's largest mission of its kind, with a force of 22,126 personnel (Lotze, 2013).

**Figure 1**  
Conceptual Framework



*Note.* Developed by the researchers (2022) based on the theoretical review.

Furthermore, according to Adula (2019), Chan (2019) and Apuuli (2015), the IGAD peace efforts in Sudan and Somalia were political initiatives led by one or more-member nations. In Sudan, Kenya seized the lead, while in Somalia, Ethiopia took the lead. Even though member governments were still fighting wars while organizing for peace, these mediations were quite successful. The institutional involvement of IGAD, on the other hand, was important in giving legitimacy, ensuring continuity, and mobilizing donor support for the protracted peace talks. In the same vein, Demeke (2014) argued that before IGAD assumed the lead, the United Nations and the United States of America were the main players in the Somali peace talks. They reasonably financed negotiations with the hope of establishing central power in Somalia (Medhane, 2002). This perhaps made Somalia a top priority on its agenda, mediating several peace negotiations aimed at creating Somalia's central government (NPR, 2007). In 2002, the IGAD Heads of State and Government met in Khartoum and made a bold commitment to achieving long-term peace and stability in Somalia. They agreed to back the Eldoret peace and

reconciliation conference, which will bring Somali leaders together to build their national government. Maalim (2013) and Weldesellassie (2011) found out that IGAD in partnership with civil society organizations and NGOs encouraged its member states to follow the democratic process, maintain acceptable levels of good governance, parliamentary systems, and female representation in politics to allow people to become more involved in local matters, as well as how government resources can be mobilized to help with development.

In addition, Elowson and de Albuquerque (2016) reported that in Djibouti, the IGAD created a research center dedicated to combating violent extremism, which will serve as a focus for information sharing and best practices among member states. Besides, IGAD established the International Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) with the mandate of intelligence and police networking including agreements on joint criminal extradition, among member states as, a counter-terrorism tool. Elowson and de Albuquerque (2016) reported that IGAD drafted Protocol on Democratic, Governance, and Elections, as well as the IGAD Election Code of Conduct and IGAD Guidelines for Election Observers, serve gaps in democratic governance, fueled terrorism, poverty, and low levels of development, among the member states. This suggests that IGAD prioritized democratization and good governance as tools for conflict prevention in order establish peace and stability. Wang and Wu (2020) and Milimo (2013) found that involving all stakeholders in conflict and mediation processes helped in tapping on deep knowledge to find an amicable lasting solution to the existing conflict. Seid et al. (2021) and Abdi and Seid (2013) stressed in their study that unilateral third-party intervention cannot build peace alone and that the primary responsibility for peacebuilding in Somalia lies with the Somali people to be given the lead role and approaches that nurture inclusion and participation among Somali identities to find a lasting solution to the Somali Conflict. A study by Asfaw (2017) underlined that IGAD has played a crucial role in ensuring security, peace, and stability in the Horn of Africa. By and large, it can be argued that regional organizations are conduits for facilitating regional responses to common problems.

According to Sempijja and Eyita-Onkon (2021), one of the ways the UN has maintained global peace and stability is through the deployment of peacekeeping. They underline that, since the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping has shown to be an effective strategy for settling conflicts. In the same context, Ampomah (2021), argued that the African Union created the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent, with the Peace and Security Council at the center (PSC). Regional organizations such as the IGAD have established Marketing Information Systems for tradable commodities, specifically crops and livestock, by developing a user-friendly networking website among the member states as well as IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative in collaboration with the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) with the financial support from the European Commission (Abdi & Seid, 2013; Bank, 2020; Mutembei, 2013). Arguably, IGAD concentrated on the environment, agriculture, and natural resource management in long-term development Milimo (2013). He emphasizes that drought control in the Horn of Africa is a top concern for IGAD to avert famine in the region. To ensure wise use of resources IGAD launched a household energy project to help member states diversify their energy sources and promote optimal energy use through the transfer of appropriate energy-efficient technologies, as well as training decision-makers, government officials, and other stakeholders (particularly women) on household energy use (Abdi & Seid, 2013). Besides, under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), IGAD established a drought monitoring center in Nairobi, Kenya, and a sub-center in Harare, Zimbabwe, to reduce the negative effects of extreme climatic events (Dubow et al., 2020). This has improved and enhanced sub-regional and national capacities to provide Climate Information, Prediction Products and Services, Early Warning, and related information. Most of the work reviewed concentrated its efforts on one or two nations. For example, Chan (2019) examined South Sudan

and Somalia, but this study focused on Mogadishu the capital city of Somalia which has greatly been affected by conflict.

## Methodology

According to Creswell (2014), the research design is the central strategy for linking conceptual research issues to relevant and feasible empirical investigation. This study used a case study design to collect qualitative data on the IGAD's engagement in creating peace and stability in Mogadishu, Somalia and used a qualitative approach to establish socioeconomic, political, and environmental reality. A case study, as opposed to a broad statistical survey, is an in-depth examination of a specific scenario (Roudsari, 2019). To provide a clear image, the researchers outlined the current condition of phenomena and probed the socio-economic, and environmental contribution of IGAD to peace and stability in Mogadishu Somalia. Using interviews, the researchers were able to collect data from IGAD officials, Somali political analysts, MPS, Ministers, and members of civil society. In the context of Kothari (2004), these were among the well-defined target populations for investigation based on their expertise and knowledge about the study subject. Drawing from the idea of the saturation data principle, as suggested by several authors such as Moura, Silva, Silva, Santos, Crespo, & Silva, (2021), Hennink, Kaiser, & Weber (2019), Saunders et al. (2018), and Wu et al. (2016), in their respective work, this study used it to determine the sample size. As it is known, the study's sample is usually made up of people who are representative of the general community (Vasileiou et. al, 2018). Therefore, 15 respondents were selected using the saturation principle from the various categories mentioned above. This involved collecting and determining adequate and necessary valid data that was considered sufficient to understand the study subject matter from chosen participants. This meant that data collection stopped after realizing that no new insights were being given by more interviews but rather respondents repeating the same data already provided. Before the interview was conducted, researchers sought an audience with the identified participant and requested their consent to participate in the study. They granted their consent after explaining to them the purpose of the study.

**Table 1**  
*Sample Distribution*

Respondents		Sample	Sample Technique
IGAD officials	N/A	3	Snowball sampling
Somali political analysts	N/A	4	Purposive sampling
Civil society members	N/A	3	Snowball sampling
Members of Parliament	N/A	3	Purposive sampling
Ministers	N/A	2	Purposive sampling
Total	N/A	15	

*Note.* Source: Primary data (2021-2022).

Sampling is the process of picking units from a population of interest for the findings to be generalizable to the population, which is not the goal of purely qualitative research. According to the saturation point principle, in a purely qualitative study, a sample size of less than 30 key informants is very fine. The argument is that, during data collection, if the researcher realizes the saturation point on the eight key informants, that sample of eight is sufficient and can stop at this point because the researcher may not use the findings for generalization of the population from which key informants were drawn, but using this they may lead to the discovery of new theories and the generation (Amin, 2005; Taherdoost, 2016). The study used both snowball and purposive sampling techniques to identify and select participants. Snowball sampling, also known as chain-referral sampling, is a non-probability

sampling approach in which the samples contain characteristics that are difficult to detect (Bradley-Levine, Mosier & Perkins, 2014; Yadav, Singh & Gupta, (2019). According to Kirchherr and Charles (2018) Snowball sampling is a recruitment technique in which study participants are asked to help researchers find more potential subjects. The researchers used this technique for identifying IGAD officials and members of the civil society members since it was hard for the researcher to identify them. The study also used purposive sampling. This is a non-probability sampling method and it occurs when elements selected for the sample are chosen by the judgment of the researcher Vehovar, Toepoel, & Steinmetz, (2016) and Creswell and Clark (2011). It is also referred to as a sampling strategy in which the researcher relies on his or her discretion when selecting members of the population to participate in the study.

Purposive sampling allows researchers to extract a plethora of information from the data they have collected. This enables researchers to emphasize the significant impact of their results on the wider public. When compared to other sampling approaches, purposeful sampling is a popular tactic among academics because it saves time and money. As a result, the researcher assessed and chose responders. Participants from the general public were chosen based on their past knowledge and expertise in this field to learn more about IGAD. The researchers used this technique with Somali political analysts, members of parliament, and ministers because the researchers believed these individuals were more knowledgeable about IGAD's role in promoting peace and stability in Mogadishu, Somalia. Primary data is gathered to address the issue at hand; researchers using an interview guide while conducting in-depth interviews with key informants collected the primary data. Researchers were interested in asking questions and probing the interviewee on the study subject to obtain adequate information. The researchers used internet interviews, such as Zoom, WhatsApp, and Google Meet interviews. The researchers used these modern supported technologies via the internet to ensure that they directly contacted the respondents while avoiding physical interaction due to COVID-19. This allowed the researchers to analyze respondents' views, beliefs, and feelings about IGAD's contribution to peace and stability in Somalia. The data collected were put into themes for coding purposes and then analyzed thematically.

## **Findings and Discussions**

### **Demographic Profile of Respondents**

Gender, age group, working experience, years spent in Mogadishu City, education level, and marital status were all recorded for study participants. This information was important since it influenced respondents' views on the research topic. The study included both male and female participants. Males made up the majority of study participants (87 percent), whereas females were only 13 percent. In terms of age, the majority of study participants (93.3 percent) were over the age of 40, with only 6.7 percent falling between the ages of 36 and 40. This implies that all survey respondents were over the age of 35 and, as a result, were more likely to be able to provide informed responses concerning IGAD's commitment to peace and stability in Mogadishu, Somalia. The majority (73.3 percent) of survey participants had work experience of eight years or more, whereas 20% had less than one year of work experience and 6.7 percent had one to four years of work experience. This means that the majority of research participants were knowledgeable enough to discuss IGAD's contributions to peace and stability in Mogadishu, Somalia. In terms of education, the majority (60.0 percent) of study participants had a Bachelor's degree, 26.7 percent held a Master's degree, and 13% held a Ph.D. The marital status revealed that 46.7 percent were married, 26.7 percent were widowed, 13.3 percent were single, and 13.3 percent were divorced. The socio-demographic findings demonstrate that all research participants were literate enough to give informed opinions on the IGAD's contributions to Mogadishu's peace and stability.

## IGAD's Political Contribution towards Peace and Stability

Objective one of the study assessed IGAD's political contribution toward peace and stability in Mogadishu, Somalia. Study participants gave varying views and opinions on the extent to which IGAD has contributed to peace and stability in Somalia. One of the interviewees revealed that;

*IGAD has attempted to resolve the Somalia conflict at various stages for many years. In 1991, the body ordered President Hassan Guled Abdtidon of Djibouti to lead a reconciliation conference in Somalia to reunite the Somali people. IGAD also facilitated negotiations, mediation, and conflict resolution, such as Eldoret, and Mbagati, who were elected as the first federal government. It has also worked with every administration in Somalia to resolve the conflict and find long-term solutions, such as the Transitional Federal Government (TFGI) and Transitional Federal Government (TFGII), which were the most difficult to reconcile and end the animosity in Somalia's regions. (Minister KIIM01, 2021)*

This view is in agreement with Moriasi (2020) and Demeke (2014) who revealed that IGAD supported the Eldoret peace and reconciliation conference, which brought together Somali representatives to discuss and agreed to form a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as the legitimate government of the Somali people. It also supports Adula (2019) revealed that IGAD played a vital role in mediating conflicts and peacebuilding in the Greater Horn of Africa. IGAD supported the initiatives of the TFG to promote peace and security through its advocacy peace programmes. IGAD through its specialized mission to Somalia facilitated Dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia amongst different regions, to promote peace and stability. However, one interviewee had a contrary view because was not convinced of IGAD's effort toward contributing to peace and stability in Mogadishu and Somalia in general. He said that;

*IGAD has not fully settled the conflict and facilitated negotiations simply because it lacks the power to do so and is not a financially and administratively independent body. The member nations and other actors were mixed at IGAD. Despite IGAD's best efforts, the conflict in Somalia, which is one of the world's most complex conflicts, has failed numerous times. When Mohamed Aided and Ali Mahdi were battling in Mogadishu, an intervention was attempted but failed. In 1991, IGAD members and the IGAD secretariat met in Djibouti to arbitrate between Somalia's warring parties. The president of Djibouti tasked IGAD with leading the mediation to bring the opposing parties together who were too far apart to reach an agreement. (Political Analyst KIIPA01, 2021)*

The finding is in support of Menkhaus et al. (2010) who blamed IGAD's shortcomings on domestic spoilers and constraints. The above opinion is also consistent with empirical literature from Khadiagala (2007), who noted that the circumstances in which the Somali agreement was signed exposed IGAD's institutional role, for example, the peace initiative was politically motivated, and the regional mediators were drawn from member states, while the IGAD secretariat never contributed anything. This is because it lacked the capacity and power to independently lead and manage any peace process. The Somalia peace project relied on Kenyan diplomatic capacity because the organization lacked organizational and logistical effort, and the Djibouti-based secretariat was far from attaining that. But more than 50% of the

respondents interviewed heaped primary blame on Somalis themselves. They argued that Somalia has a multitude of “warlords” to blame for repeatedly spoiling peace processes and efforts to revive state authority. Another key informant added that;

*For many years, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has aided in the resolution of the Somali war. The IGAD was active in the start and it made Somalia a top priority on its agenda since then, mediating a succession of peace negotiations aimed at creating the country's central authority. Even when the international community, including the United Nations, the United States, and others failed to interfere, IGAD has continued to play the conflict resolution role in the horn of Africa. (Member of Parliament KIIM02, 2021)*

The above expression supports Young (2012), finding that IGAD was able to create a monopoly in the entire process and earned legitimacy and widespread acceptance as the best venue for resolving conflict in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, one IGAD official stated;

*The contribution of IGAD to the political stability of Somalia and the Horn of Africa at large cannot be underestimated. After the failure of previous conflict resolution deals, it is IGAD inaugurated a peacebuilding process to bring the Djibouti-backed Transitional National Government (TNG) and its Ethiopian-backed opponents in the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) into a comprehensive political settlement. (Civil Society Member KIICS01, 2021)*

The submission is in support of Maalim’s (2013) study that found that the IGAD plays a critical role in mediation, peacekeeping, and peace support activities in the IGAD region. When respondents were probed further, on how IGAD conducts the peace process, one interviewee said that;

*IGAD brings warring parties to the negotiation table and the body appoints a neutral mediator to find lasting peace solutions to the conflict. For example, in the 1991 Djibouti peace process, IGAD tasked Djibouti's president, Hassan Glued Aptidon to mediate the peace process. As a result, the conflicting parties agreed to nominate Ali Mahdi Mohamed as president. (Political Analyst KIIPA02, 2021)*

Mengistu (2018) and Apuuli (2015) agree, stating that IGAD has been successful in convincing warring factions to sign cease-fire agreements and enabling conflicting parties in Somalia and South Sudan to work together to ensure the peace agreement's implementation. The body engaged both internal and external parties in the mediation process. When asked about the mechanism IGAD used to promote peace and stability, one respondent mentioned that;

*The IGAD peace procedures have been conducted in different countries. The first one happened in Djibouti, when Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the government president, and the mediator were elected. Another one was held in Khartoum, where IGAD was present, but the meeting was dominated by Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir followed by the Eldoret and Mbagati peace conferences in Kenya.*

*Although IGAD was involved in these processes, it did not lead the meetings.* (Civil Society Member KIICS02, 2021)

The findings are consistent with Abdi's (2017) findings that IGAD lacked organizational and logistical effort, and the Djibouti-based secretariat was far from achieving it. Khadiagala (2007) claims that both the Sudan and Somalia peace initiatives relied on Kenyan diplomatic capacity. For example, Kenya appointed General Lazarus Sumbeiywo as the Sudan peace conference's chief negotiator, while Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat handled the Somalia peace conference. Kenya attempted to help in any manner possible, including diplomatic and organizational support, as well as maintaining political neutrality. Furthermore, during the IGAD peace process, one IGAD official said that;

*IGAD member states converge and discuss a particular matter. In case of conflict resolution, IGAD approaches hostile parties, identifies mediators, and gets all stakeholders to sit at one table to find lasting peace solutions. Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have all played mediation roles in the past.* (IGAD Official KI1 IIGADO01, 2021)

Another interviewee added that;

*IGAD has been involved in several peace processes aimed at resolving the Somali problem. From 1991 to 2002, IGAD offered member nations a mandate to deal with the Somalia issue by coordinating several peace procedures to reconcile the warring parties, who were dispersed and distrusted after a civil war with their clan's militia. Djibouti and Ethiopia were the first to respond to the situation in Somalia.* (Minister KIIM02, 2021)

Maalim (2013) shares this assessment, stating that the most important aspect of IGAD's presence in Somalia was able to bring heads of state together regularly to discuss Somalia's stability and the creation of the Somali government to be a key concern. Respondents stressed that;

*In many aspects, the IGAD played a role in the formation of the Somali government and member nations. When Somalia's government collapsed, IGAD attempted to reconstruct it by collecting and uniting Somali people to reconcile and end hostilities. They added that IGAD and its member states have contributed to the creation and strengthening of the government of Somalia and its member states. IGAD is working with its member nations and foreign actors who are interested in the Somalia crisis. Whenever they construct a government, they bind the mediated to resolve any lingering issues. All Transitional Governments that were constituted outside of the country, such as Djibouti twice and Kenya once, were involved in IGAD.* (Political Analyst KIIPA01, 2021; (Member of Parliament KI1MP01, 2021)

Furthermore, respondents claimed that IGAD was involved in resolving Somalia's security, governance, social, and economic concerns, as well as the country's connection with international donors and the military's rebuilding. When the study participants were asked to elaborate on their thoughts on the subject, they expressed a range of opinions. Other participants said;

*IGAD began training Somalia's military, directing member states to train strong armies as part of the country's settlement for peace and stability. IGAD entailed the integration of Somalia's military to build trust and unity, particularly in the Jubaland state as federalism. IGAD helped Somalia's military become more ethical by raising awareness and strengthening capacity". They insisted that "IGAD assisted in the development of Somalia's military during the establishment of Transitional governments, training the military in various regional countries such as Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia, among others, to receive Somali military participating in the insecurity, instability to achieve peace and stability. IGAD also has assisted Somali in military capacity building and awareness for them to be more ethical and humane. (Minister KIIM01, 2021; IGAD Official KIIGADO2, 2021)*

While others opined that;

*IGAD did not play a significant role in the development of Somalia's military. IGAD member states were in charge of training the army, which was referred to as a copy army. The majority of the army was trained in Ethiopia and Uganda under President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. Some troops in Mogadishu were trained in seminars and workshops, and IGAD has funds to contribute to the country since members do not want to support it. (IGAD Official KIIGADO3, 2021)*

The former submission is supported by Maalim (2013), who stated that IGAD has dedicated its efforts to training and equipping Somali military personnel, as well as assisting Somalia's political recovery, including setting its political agenda about Puntland, Somaliland, and the Jubba, to establish peace and stability in Somalia, by collaborating with various entities such as the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the African Union, civil society, religious leaders, and traditional leaders. Respondents argued that:

*The IGAD closely collaborates with different parties on the situation in Somalia, whether on a local or international level. IGAD has worked with traditional elders, particularly in registering for the government's capacity-building and awareness-raising efforts to address domestic abuse." (Civil Society Member KIICS01, 2021). They also insisted that "because IGAD is reliant on other actors such as the United Nations, the European Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and others. It has been cooperative with these countries in its engagements. Traditional elders and religious leaders have no common contacts because the IGAD is a political group that can only communicate during election season. (Political Analyst KIIPA2, 2021)*

Besides rebuilding the military and working with other development partners to rebuild Somalia's political economy, IGAD has been involved in Somalia's election process. When respondents were asked about this matter one participant said;

*IGAD has been cooperatively participating in the election of Somalia. It has been providing capacity building, seminars, workshops, and awareness-raising while coordinating with other actors. However, during the current administration, foreign actors work together to provide alerts and announcements to the government. The IGAD monitors the election, ensuring that the conditions are met for a free and fair election, as well as preventing corruption and increasing transparency” (Member of Parliament KIMP02, 2021). They also said that “IGAD has been involved in Somalia's democracy and good governance, but not to a large extent because it has the funds to contribute; it requires financial assistance to build government institutions to achieve good governance and democracy. Other key elements launched by IGAD include capacity building in various institutions, training, workshops, and outreach to traditional elders, youths, civil society, civil workers, and parliaments, among others. (Political Analyst KIIPA2, 2021)*

They also stated that IGAD encouraged all of its member states, including Somalia, to follow their constitutions, participate in the democratic process, and maintain acceptable levels of governance. IGAD collaborates with regional NGOs and civil society on themes such as good governance, parliamentary systems, and female representation in politics, and in 2009, it hosted the IGAD Women Parliamentary Conference. IGAD recently held a federalism conference in Ethiopia and is working to increase conversation on how federalism may benefit the region by allowing people to become more involved in local matters, as well as how government resources can be mobilized to help with development. These views are consistent with Wasajja (2021) and Maalim (2013) who reported that the IGAD facilitated Somali-owned dialogue in which they agreed to organize inclusive and credible election outcomes based on the spirit of collegiality. But there was one participant who argued that;

*IGAD did not only contribute to democracy and good governance in Somalia, but it also did provide some training and workshops for civil servants and other members of society because IGAD represents member states, and the majority of them have improved democracy and good governance, except Kenya, which has not held an election or pronoun. Rule of law and openness are essential for good governance and democracy. Somalia lacks institutions capable of developing democracy and good governance, therefore good governance begins with accountability and equal treatment under the law for all individuals. Furthermore, all of these are still in place, so it is necessary to operate and implement them. (Civil Service member KIICS02, 2021)*

### **IGAD’s Socioeconomic Contribution towards Peace and Stability**

Participants in the study were asked about the IGAD's socio-economic contribution to Mogadishu's peace and stability, with a focus on promoting economic integration, promoting free movement of goods/services and people within the region, creating an enabling environment for cross-border trade, promoting sustainable development, and providing social services such as schools and hospitals, as well as immigration issues in the region. The dominant view was that,

*IGAD had not actively fostered regional and national economic integration, but it has made some contributions. The body established guidelines to address regional integration divisions, primarily between Kenya and Somalia. To achieve peace, stability, and prosperity, it used free commerce and labor to interchange free commodities and people. It also promoted the free movement of commodities, services, and people throughout the region and at the national level, motivating Somalia to integrate at a national level with member states to promote peace and stability and increase commerce and economic entrepreneurship. (Member of Parliament KIIMP3, 2021)*

They also noted that “economic integration in the region and at the national level was not promoted by IGAD. For instance, a joint meeting on economic integration was held, but it was not implemented. There was some talk about improving integrations, but no legislation was passed on the subject. Somalia has made domestic efforts to integrate its regions, but the IGAD has not contributed to Somalia's integration. Abdi and Seid’s (2013) study finding which revealed that IGAD had a low contribution to the economic integration of member countries. However, two respondents refuted such opinion and said that;

*IGAD had worked on several projects, many of which are aimed at improving regional integration. The body’s regional integration goal is outlined in the Minimum Integration Plan, which is based on the fundamentals that member states must adhere to as part of their membership. As a regional organization, IGAD set policies and goals for economic integration. (IGAD Official KIIIGADO02, 2021)*

*IGAD has played a key role especially by establishing protocols and policies by free movement of goods and services. IGAD’s labor minister has signed economic cooperation agreements in cross-border areas, so these policies include Humans and animals can freely cross borders and exchange goods and services in the Transend zone. (Political Analyst KIIPA03, 2021)*

This is supported by Babikir et al. (2015) who disclosed that IGAD had established many programs and centers of excellence to enhance integration in different thematic areas. These include the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (IGAD CEWARN), the Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (IGAD CPAC), the Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development (IGAD CPALD), the Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (IGAD CEPCVE), the Sheikh Technical Veterinary School (IGAD STVS), the Institute for Diplomatic Studies (IGAD FSI), and other centers and programs. All of these centers and programmes are contributing to the solution of many challenges facing integration in the region and thus contributing to the integration process at the continental level. Regarding promoting regional cross-border and local trade in Somalia, one key respondent said that;

*In partnership with the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and with financial backing from the European Commission, IGAD has launched a sustainable development project called the IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative (EC) to enable member states to develop and implement livestock-related policies that will aid*

*in the long-term alleviation of food insecurity and poverty.* (Member of Parliament KIIMP02, 2021)

The findings are in line with IGAD (2020) work which found that IGAD helped African regional entities to develop and implement policies that support pastoralist livelihoods and that it was critical to the Horn of Africa's development and food security plans. The IGAD Livestock Policy Initiative is part of a larger process of contemporary policy analysis aimed at improving understanding of wealth-differentiated capacities and aspirations commercialization in pastoralist areas, and how this trend contributes to a strong group of commercial actors on the one hand while increasing pastoral destitution on the other. However, on the contrary, one respondent noted that: "IGAD has not developed any long-term projects in Somalia because the country is unable to repay the World Bank loan. Despite this, IGAD no longer contributes to Somalia's long-term programs" (Civil Society member KIISC03, 2021). This opinion concurs with World Bank/International Monetary Fund (2019) statistics which show that Somalia is faced with a huge debt burden. Consequently, in the absence of debt relief, Somalia will remain in debt distress. This probably can be explained by IGAD's failure to support long-term programs. Respondents mentioned that there had been limited support to

*Establish schools and hospitals, and money is required. In Somalia, the IGAD has given limited capacity building, workshops, and training by the federal government and member states, but its services are insufficient. Health expenditure remains very low and there is a critical shortage of health workers.* (Political Analyst, KIIPA03 2021)

Respondents also emphasized that,

*IGAD has not dealt with regional immigration; there were certain announcements and protocols published a while ago but never implemented; as a result, the most serious consequence IGAD has is a lack of funding; it is always reliant on other donors. To stop the floods, the IGAD issued various announcements and alerts to immigrants.* (Member of Parliament KIIMP02, 2021)

This is in line with the view of Castillejo (2019) who unveiled that there was no ratified policy on immigration in the region. As such, the IGAD Plan of Action for Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees, together with the National Development Plan, has guided the operationalization of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) for Somalia at the federal level. At the federal and state level, regional durable solutions plans are being elaborated. In support of the delivery of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) in the Horn of Africa, IGAD has been playing a central role. IGAD took the lead in bringing together its seven members' heads of state in March 2017 to agree to a Comprehensive Approach to Durable Solutions on the Somali Refugee Situation. A respondent added that;

*The IGAD has agencies and regulations in place to help with regional immigration concerns. It implemented an action plan in response to the immigration situation in 2001, 2015, and 2020, and made a declaration in Nairobi, where an extraordinary dialogue and discussion about the immigration issue was held in order to find a long-term solution and stop the floods of immigrants seeking asylum and security.* (IGAD Official KIIGADO03, 2021)

In line with the above finding, Van Walraven et al. (2008) and Assefa and Yemane (2017) argues that United Nations agencies and IGAD Secretariat launched a Joint Programme to facilitate safe, orderly, and regular migration in the IGAD region

### **IGAD's Environmental Contribution towards Peace and Stability**

Drought and desertification management, environmental protection, and climate change management were among the topics covered in the interview on this subject. Responses emerged from the respondents that:

*Agriculture, natural resources, and management policies were developed by the IGAD. IGAD is responsible for weather control, building government institutions in accordance with farm products, and cultivating businesses in order to reduce poverty in the region and at the national level. It encouraged member governments, such as Somalia, to enhance agriculture land rather than make dissertations in order to avoid calamities. (Minister KIIM03, 2021)*

They claimed that IGAD established platforms and initiatives to strengthen regional integration, economic cooperation, and climate change adaptation and mitigation skills in order to address the security implications of climate change. Such programs can help to improve livelihoods, raise output and income, expand markets, and stimulate investment. One respondent specifically said that;

*Droughts and dissertations occurred in Somalia, and IGAD was active in a modest way. Because IGAD lacks sufficient funds, it seeks funding from other sources. As a result, it keeps track of the disaster's scope and issues declarations to other international actors to assist the affected people. In the Beledweyne floods, IGAD member states sent a total of 39 shipments of food, including Ethiopia. IGAD provided training on how to get away from the river's risks rather than stay near its bank. (Civil Society Member KIICS02, 2021)*

The finding is in line with Mutembei (2013) reported that IGAD had recognized the link between climate change and security as well as recurrent droughts and floods which had become more intense. However, probably a lot more needs to be done and significant progress could be made if IGAD took the lead in tackling climate challenges, particularly in the development of regional mitigation and adaptation programs. This is because Somalia lacks the capacity to deal with major disasters such as tsunamis, protracted droughts, and El Nino floods. To emphasize the issue of environmental preservation, one interviewee said;

*IGAD has done a good job of involving environmental preservation at the regional and national levels. IGAD provided environmental protection training to guard against chopping trees, wooding, and burning charcoal capacity building and awareness. (Minister KIIM02, 2021)*

These views concur with Weldesellassie (2011) who found that IGAD under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), established a drought monitoring center in Nairobi, Kenya, and a sub-center in Harare,

Zimbabwe, in an effort to reduce the negative effects of extreme climatic events. In this regard, one study participant added that;

*Throughout response to climate change, the IGAD has established several norms and regulations in the region. Furthermore, supplies Somalia with a satellite for climate change monitoring and protection, as well as advanced training for personnel who operate the equipment. The satellite center in Somalia is currently operational, monitoring and analyzing the weather of rivers, whether high or low, wind, and even the ocean and sea, and interpreting what is happening in the weather, whether it is raining or drying due to climate change. (IGAD Official KIIIGADO01, 2021)*

But a contradicting view was raised by one participant that, “IGAD has not offered policies that harmonize the environment at the regional and national levels through revealing agricultural and natural resource management. As I have stated, IGAD has no authority to support environmental projects” (Member of Parliament KIIMP01, 2021). In light of this, Eklöw and Krampe, (2019) and Milimo (2013) claim that, while IGAD has been granted a mission to develop regional disaster risk reduction plans, its roles and policies in this regard are unclear. Policies and plans at the national level are inadequately stated and poorly integrated. Ethiopia's National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (NPDPM), published in 1993, appears to be the only cohesive and complete policy in the region. Kenya and Uganda are still working on their policies. Every country has some catastrophe risk management legislation, but in many cases, it is buried in other legislation and difficult to find. The region's national disaster risk management agencies arose in isolation and are not part of the mainstream disaster risk management theory and practice. Many countries lack a focal point or framework for effective information exchange, despite the fact that some ISDR focal points have been created in some countries. One participant revealed that;

*Droughts and dissertations were tackled by the IGAD, which established a climate prediction and application center in 1989, with 24 countries from the greater horn of Africa included and established in Kenya and Harare, Zimbabwe. This foundation has facilitated many things such as extreme climate events. In addition, IGAD created the Drought Resilience Initiative to operationalize policies targeted at aiding people during droughts. (Political Analyst KIIPA01, 2021)*

While another interviewee stated that;

*In order to develop peace and stability in the region, IGAD prioritizes environmental protection. Protecting for wooding, chopping trees, and burning charcoal are wreaking havoc on the ecosystem, causing droughts and diseases to worsen. IGAD is involved in controlling and dealing with climate change in the regions, as well as formulating policies to prevent the occurrence of climate change in the region in order to strengthen the region's security. (Civil Society Member KII SC01, 2021)*

In addition, one respondent said that;

*The environment and agriculture division of the IGAD focuses on long-term development and natural resource management. The authority, on the other hand, has a strategy rather than an environmental or natural resource policy. Agriculture, livestock, and food security, natural resources and energy, environmental protection, and dryland agricultural research and technology are the four topic areas that make up the division. (Civil Society Member KII SC02, 2021)*

Stressing the same issue another key informant said that;

*IGAD adopted the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) and a number of related initiatives aimed at operationalizing the drought resilience agenda in the region's arid and semi-arid lands in response to one of the worst droughts in the region, which particularly affected Somalia in 2010 and 2011. IGAD developed the Environment Assessment for Sustainable Environment Management as one of its initiatives following the Forum on Environmental Protection in Nairobi in 1990 and the Regional Strategy to Combat Desertification. (Member parliament KII MP03, 2021)*

The above IGAD effort is in line with Mutembei's (2013) argument that the IGAD was the force behind the Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) that gave birth to the Country Programme Paper (CPP) in Somalia which aimed at enhancing livelihoods of the people.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

From fore discussions, the study concludes that politically, IGAD has contributed greatly toward peace and stability in Mogadishu. It is because of the mediation efforts of IGAD that the international community tried to restore the TFG, improve its governance and security capability, and enhance its legitimacy. IGAD's mediation process brought onboard internal and external actors. In order to enlarge the appeal of the TFGs amongst Somalis by establishing a more equal power, and sharing agreements, IGAD has drawn up plans to deploy a peacekeeping force to provide support for the TFG. IGAD has also contributed to the building of democracy and governance structures in Somalia by facilitating the electoral process. The study concludes that IGAD has made a socioeconomic contribution toward peace and stability in Somalia. For instance, it was reported that the body has promoted economic integration, free movement of goods/services and people within the region, creation of an enabling environment for cross border trade, promotion of sustainable development, and provision of social services like schools and hospitals as well as issues relating to immigration in the region.

However, some respondents were not contented with IGAD's contribution, especially to the social services sector since schools and health centers are still in a poor state. IGAD adopted the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI) and a number of related initiatives aimed at operationalizing the drought resilience agenda in the region's arid and semi-arid lands in response to one of the worst droughts in the region, which particularly affected Somalia in 2010 and 2011. The body also developed the Environment Assessment for Sustainable Environment Management as one of its initiatives to combat desertification. Agriculture, natural resources, and management policies were developed by the IGAD. It also provided environmental protection training to guard against chopping trees,

wooding, and burning charcoal capacity building and awareness supplies. A satellite for climate change monitoring and protection, as well as advanced training for personnel who operate the equipment, were also put in place. IGAD and Government of Somalia collaborate with Somali society to elect a visionary Somali leader.

The researcher also recommends that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the government of Somalia should do genuine reconciliation and a Somali constitution. The researcher suggests that the Somali government and IGAD form a national army and a Somali national defense force in collaboration with other actors. The researcher recommends that IGAD and Government should do Somalia's Somali-led, Somali-owned and post-conflict reconstruction. IGAD and government should establish a political network to promote governance maintaining justice, equality, and the rule of law. IGAD and the government should generate an environment that encourages job creation to mitigate problems. IGAD and international donors should allocate funds to government institutions. IGAD should also be given support from the government to enable them to reach various communities in an offer to bring peace. The IGAD should establish peacebuilding in Somali society to achieve lasting peace. The intergovernmental authorities on development and government should construct more environmental and agricultural divisions to focus on natural resources. The government and IGAD should undertake drought control in Somalia as a priority for fragile people. The researcher also recommends that IGAD should control climate changes, in Somalia.

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